Here are the first two sections of my third essay, which is to be handed in next week!
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Following moral philosopher Chidi Adegonye[1], I believe there is no one answer. Therefore, I will not argue that in all cases empirical bioethics is better placed than philosophical bioethics to resolve real-life issues in the biosciences; but I will argue that in certain areas it is.
The paper proceeds as follows: in Section I, I introduce my reasons for making this claim; Section II sketches out my preferred methodology and considers the importance of contextualising the ethical issue. In Section III, I seek to demonstrate why an understanding of the thoughts, values and behaviours of stakeholders matter and then, in Section IV, explain how a pluralistic approach to theory contributes to the formulation of a practical and ethical resolution and address an objection.
As the question required consideration of a particular case, I focus upon the role of a bioethicist in a committee formulating new guidelines for the use of rodents in depression research. It is a current area of concern among both scientists who question the value of animal experimentation and also those who seek to make scientific progress in this domain.
Section I
First, I must clarify what I mean by ‘resolve’. One can resolve a problem cognitively by coming to a decision; one can resolve it practically by overcoming it in the real world. In this essay I am being more specific: resolving the issue in this situation requires the solution to be agreed upon and enacted in the near future.
Further, I am understanding philosophical bioethics to mean the application of a particular theory to reach an ethical decision on a real-life issue.
One final caveat. Empirical ethics is an emerging field, which encompasses a plethora of different methodologies, using differing forms of validation for the normative claims made. It is difficult to critically assess a piece of work in empirical ethics outside of the context for which it was adapted. All this makes peer review challenging and casts doubt on how it could be considered as a new disciplinary field (Davies, Ives, and Dunn 2015). However, I am not concerned with justifying the use of all approaches or validating a new discipline. I am simply arguing that an approach modelled largely on Jonathan Wolff’s ‘engaged ethics’ (Wolff 2012) would be better placed than philosophical bioethics in the situation I have suggested.
While Wolff does not categorically define his methodology as empirical ethics, he does assert that the philosopher must be in ‘pragmatic mode’ and determine ‘a recommendation that is sensitive both to the evidence and relevant values’. Both claims differentiate Wolff’s approach from philosophical bioethics, as I understand it.
Before proceeding with my argument, let’s consider how a philosophical approach might proceed in this test-case. A philosophical bioethicist, PB say, could construct an argument based on Tom Regan’s work concluding that the use of rodents in depression research was not ethical because it would be a violation of rodents’ rights not to be used as means-to-an-end. There are two limitations to this. One is that while PB would consider data (the sentience of rodents), his approach would occlude other data which are morally relevant in the real-life case. The second is that while he would have resolved the issue in the first sense, he would be unlikely to do so in the second. In order for that to happen, PB would have to carry his fellow committee members with him.
Such a panel would not be comprised solely of Homo philosophicus. That may be a good thing as philosophers have not reached a group resolution (in either first or second senses) on many issues (Persson 2018). Instead, it would comprise members of various Homo tribes - economicus, anthropocentricus, scientificus, politicus and maybe even those from the under-represented group of Femina sapiens. As there will be a variety of values at play; different levels of aptitude and interest in ethical theorising, and the need to take action, not argue indefinitely, the ethicist - if she wishes to make an impact - would need more than PB’s arguments. As Wolff explains, ‘Taking a philosophical theory… and then applying it ‘neat’ to problems in public policy typically leads to views that have little chance of adoption, and, indeed, may leave practical people incredulous’ (Wolff 2012).
What is being sought is not the ‘right’ resolution full stop, but the ‘best’ resolution given the real-life constraints. This is messy territory. It is not an arena of pure reason: interests compete, facts are contested, the inertia of sunk assets and the strong pull of the status quo may well be immune to the philosophical approach. The engaged ethicist must be willing to make compromises. I will consider how PB might respond later.
The engaged bioethicist, would, of course, utilise the skills which the pure discipline sharpens, such as careful analysis and sound argumentation, as well as a detailed knowledge of the ethical writing in relevant areas. But she would also have to be a mistress of the context and the concrete; understanding both the facts of the matter and how those facts matter to various parties as well as being appreciative of ‘the irreducible multiplicity of goods that constitute specific practical conflicts’ (Minteer 2004).
Let me suggest an analogy using Jorge Luis Borges’ short story ‘On Exactitude in Science’[2]. In philosophical ethics, empirical data is used in varying degrees to create a cartographical representation of reality, as it were. Engaged ethics is not, as in the story, seeking to create ‘a Map of the Empire whose size was that of the Empire’, but instead to engage with the actual terrain by employing something akin to ‘perspectival pluralism’ in science (Veit and Browning 2020): considering data from multiple sources; engaging with qualitative as well as quantitative data and using a variety of theoretical ‘lenses’ to address the ethical issues raised.
In the following section, I will seek to construct the first pillar in support of my argument.
[1] The Good Place, S4, Ep5. Ingmar Persson makes a similar point (Persson 2018).
[2] https://genius.com/Jorge-luis-borges-on-exactitude-in-science-annotated
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Section II will follow another day...
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