Partiality

Bernard Williams was really antsy about the failure of moral theories to consider the partial interests of subjects. His argument goes something like this. Ground projects are what gives meaning to people's lives. If people have no meaning in their lives they do not want to live and if they don't want to live, what call can morality have on them? Ground projects thus have an importance which cannot be questioned by morality. If a moral demand means that an agent should give up or betray her ground project and thus have no reason to go on living, then morality is absurd.

Susan Wolf expands upon this and comes up with the maxim that meaning arises in a person's life when a subjective attraction meets objective attractiveness. What she is saying is that the ground project needs to have some value - so it can't be molesting children or counting blades of grass. It could be academic or aesthetic, charitable or familial (to be a good parent.

She agrees with Williams that if a person does not care about herself or her projects then it is a legitimate question why she should care about the world at large. And if that question arises when someone does not care, it's not obvious that it should not be a legitimate question when someone does care about themselves and their projects. Or at least, why should someone care more about the world at large than about the projects which give her life meaning and thus instantiate in her some care for something, anything. Her claim is that the recognition of the moral equality of others should lead her to respect the legitimacy of others and of their projects and that this in turn confers upon her some obligation to relieve suffering.

So essentially, her view is that morality is rationally as well as practically conditioned to a connection that gives life meaning - because when there is a reason to live there is a reason to care what happens in the world.

A philosopher E. Lord makes the claim that partiality does give us reasons for certain actions. If you are my friend, I have reasons to spend time replying to your emails. He addresses the three main ways of thinking that attempt to justify partiality: projects, relationships and individuals. So the Williams' idea is that what I am partial to falls into a domain of my 'projects', which partly constitute my identity - the things and people and plans that give meaning to my life. Others, like Sheffler, suggest that people and things matter because of the relationship we have with them, which has a history and to which we have certain obligations. Others claim that the value lies in the individual persons or things. Lord says the reasons for action are predicated on the individual, intensified by the relationship and the importance of the relationship arises out of the vital role of partiality in our ground projects.

Yes, I'm a bit confused too.

But here is a thought experiment:

Anna has a son Ben. Ben needs to use a wheelchair and has only limited ability to communicate without the aid of expensive computerised equipment. He is however physically healthy. Anna knows that if she donated the money to the best charity on Give Money she could save many lives, while if she spends it on a computer for her son she will only assist him to communicate. As all people are equal, and it is better to maximise the good, she sends the money to the charity.

Here is another:

Charlie works in an orphanage. He has been caring for various children including Donna who was traumatised as an infant and who trusts only Charlie and no other caregiver. One day, in a government adoption programme, Charlie, who is deemed a good potential parent, is granted the chance to look after one of the children in his care. All the children will get equally good homes. All the other children except Donna are emotionally secure, though all have need for special care in some way - just not relationship-dependent care. Donna, who has bonded with him, is terrified of all other adults. Charlie sees all the children as equal and decides to draw a straw to choose which one.

These cases are different, but both intuitively leave us feeling that the impartial are moral monsters. One rests on proximity, one on individual need.

I think what I am trying to explore is the way in which all moral theories lead to some form of 'rule-worship' that abstracts from and negates the moral problems real people experience in real lives.