So, I have come across a couple of things that might feed into my prominence-of-'thou' view.
I doubt they do really, if I had properly read and fully understood them, but they allowed me to think.
One is proposed by the philosopher Stephen Darwall. I have not read his book, but I did read this review of it. I'm not sure that I understood a great deal of the review which further discourages me from reading the book, but nonetheless it acted as a kind of thought trampoline.
What he may be saying is that morality is founded to some extent on taking a 'second person view', it's that which makes something pressing or motivational or required... or a mixture of all three. So, if I consider hurting you, by inhabiting 'you', I realise that being hurt would be a bad thing. If I consider not paying my taxes, then the 'you' is society, which would be harmed by my action and would have recourse to prosecute me. Further, he seems to suggest that there is moral benefit to be found in having a you within the self-concept. Which sounds confusing, but in my thinking and reasoning, this could be the 'future me' or the 'better me'. By vaping I am harming the future me and am denying the prudential claims of the better me. Thus, were I able to inhabit those positions, I would see that what I am doing is wrong and perhaps would have greater motivation to stop.
I think this is interesting as to me it would make a difference if I regarded these other yous as thous instead of its. By which I mean that the more that I am willing to accept and appreciate the other, the more salient that other perspective will be and the more strongly I will be motivated to act. On the other hand, if I cannot grant the other her own values, interests and needs, then I will not see that she has any pressing claim.
Of course, this as so far considered runs the risk of vulgar relativism - in that if her values and interests meant that she favoured kicking dogs, my position would seem to justify that action. Which I do not want to be the case. Maybe, as the dog too would be a 'thou', I could counter her position by telling her that to the extent that she is failing to see the dog as a 'thou', she is failing to act as a moral agent. That works. In that case.
This claim does act as a way of embracing impartiality, then, while preventing the tendency to value all other perspectives the same (if those perspectives fail to acknowledge the 'thou'-ness of some beings). But I think it also allows for some of the special goods in life that entail from deep interpersonal relationships, in that the 'thou' of my friend, incorporating as it would the special desire, for example, that I spend time with her, would confer a different duty upon me than would the 'thou' of a stranger, who did not have that desire. But what about if my children desired my money (for, let's say, philosophy books) while strangers abroad required that money to avoid starvation? The 'thou' need of the stranger is clearly much stronger, so does this view offer any support to partiality within relationships? My children might 'feel rejected' by my failure to pay for their books, but that doesn't seem to weigh much against starvation.
Briefly, the other philosopher who has interesting views in a similar area is Thomas Nagel. He writes in Equality and Partiality about the two different perspectives each of us has and can take and makes the claim that ethics and politics need to take this into account. He does not believe that a purely impersonal perspective is either possible or indeed the 'best' case to aim for, but the problem is how to balance the two without sinking into 'yuppie ethics' - basically that my kids' need for philosophy textbooks trumps the starvation of strangers.
This extended essay I will fully read once I have finished reading the compulsory coursework as, though he claims not to have resolved the issue, I am sure that he will have got some many miles further down the road than I have!
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