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Why not?

Writer's picture: CroneCrone

OK, so here's another thing I don't understand about ethics.


You can, in theory, work out what people should DO, and, at a deeper level, arguably, what they should FEEL and THINK about certain things - like racism, torture and murder. But you don't seem to be allowed to tell them what they 'should' value.


You can, in theories of wellbeing, claim that what REALLY makes people happy is getting wise or listening to Beethoven, but you can't tell people that they should value wisdom or Beethoven's Piano Sonatas, even though, in your view, wisdom and the sonatas have intrinsic value.


Why not?


The assumption, it seems to me, is that you, the ethicist, can't change people's feelings. And, I think, in large part, that is empirically true. I might feel that everyone hates me though I rationally know that everyone does not hate me (they don't even all hate me unconsciously), but I might still FEEL as though everyone hates me.


What this suggests is that, at bottom, analytical philosophers know the limits of rationality.


My feeling that everyone hates me might be irrational, but it might not be unreasonable. The reason may be that I feel that I have let everyone down and through transference I am attributing those feelings to others and thus feel that everyone hates me. There are good reasons why I feel as I do. If I really have let everyone down, but they, generous beings that they are, do not hate me, then my 'feeling' might be entirely reasonable. I might well recognise the empirical facts - of not being hated - but I might feel that I deserve to feel bad for having let them down, which might encourage me not to do it in future. If I did not actually let everyone down, I might even recognise that and acknowledge that my feelings appear to serve no purpose, but I might STILL feel the same.


Likewise, if I have certain genes, my mother was stressed when I was in the womb and I was abused as a kid - knowing all this stuff may not be enough to stop me feeling angry, aggressive, slighted and so on. Yes, I may have some control over my behaviour - but how receptive I am to arguments in favour of not acting out my anger will be determined not be the pure force of rationality, but by all these biological and environmental factors over the course of millennia and milliseconds.


So, what I'm saying is that just as your ethicist can't condemn a person for not liking Beethoven, maybe that can't really condemn them for not valuing the greatest happiness for the greatest number.



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