II.ii
For those antithetical to biotechnological enhancements, the Preservers, the value of ‘what it is to be human’ has been forcefully stated. This implies that they have a staunch definition of human nature. Michael Sandel refers to the, ‘unbidden’ and the ‘giftedness’ of existence; Francis Fukuyama cites ‘Factor X’ (Fukuyama, 2003) while Leon Kass talks of soul-elevation and ‘the deep mysteries of nature and of life’ (Kass, 1997). None of these are helpful in determining what confers human dignity. Human nature, it seems, is like Louis Armstrong’s view of jazz: if you have to ask what it is, then you’ll never know. These appeals to an ineffable unknown appear more like responses to the sacred than responses to something that can be scientifically or philosophically defined.
In fact, rather than attempting to categorise what is precious about human nature, opponents of enhancement instead define it, in a question-begging way, as essentially what makes enhancement per se unjustifiable.
Thus, Sandel writes, ‘the promise of mastery is flawed. It threatens to banish our appreciation of life as a gift, and to leave us with nothing to affirm or behold outside our own will.’ (Sandel, 2009) Likewise, Kass states, ‘Enchanted and enslaved by the glamour of technology, we have lost our awe and wonder before the deep mysteries of nature and of life… the Frankenstein-ian hubris to create human life and increasingly to control its destiny; man playing God.’ (Kass, 1997) Their opposition to enhancement bears some similarity with Blaise Pascal’s (1623-62) fear of the unknown: ‘The eternal silence of these infinite spaces fills me with dread.’
In response to the unknown, the Preservers focus on a feeling of awe for what is given by nature.
Kristjan Kristjanssen, in his philosophical analysis of awe, writes that this kind of response ‘confirm[s] or reinforce[s] existing structures.’ (Kristjánsson, 2017) Such a response has been noted in environmental ethics, where, while the awe-response mobilises action to conserve the environment, it simultaneously leads to an excessive focus on purity or sanctity: ‘an awe-based environmentalism encourages the assumption that preserving nature means keeping human influence out of it—keeping it purely divine rather than sullied by human hands.’ (McSHANE, 2018) The accusation of status quo bias is given extra weight, perhaps, by this analysis. (Bostrom & Ord, 2006)
Kevin Tobia, in an analysis of wonder, a response closely associated to awe, quotes Martha Nussbaum who writes, ‘If we feel wonder looking at a complex organism, that wonder at least suggests the idea that it is good for that being to persist and flourish as the kind of thing it is’ and he suggests that wonder is foundational to her account of human dignity (Tobia, 2015). Nussbaum often refers to human neediness and dependency (Nussbaum, 2003); in a similar way, Erik Parens considers the gifts dependent on mortality, aging and fragility (Parens, 1995).
For the Preservers, the limitations and fallibilities of the human condition are meritorious in their own right, unsullied by individualistic striving or technological tinkering. Certainly, it would not appear ameliorative to enhance neediness, dependency or mortality. Instead of valorising autonomy, like the Pragmatists, they value authenticity. And, just as the Pragmatists justify their belief in the merit of individual freedom (most of the time) in enhancement by defining human nature as capacities for rational and moral decision making and the drive to be better, so the Preservers use their ‘gut-feeling’ of sacredness to justify their scepticism about enhancements.
A similarly circular argument is apparent among the Prophets –the Transhumanists.
II.iii
Kass in the passage quoted above uses the term ‘enchantment’ as a pejorative. This is interesting as the Preservers’ responses of awe and wonder are held up as a beneficial reaction that points toward some intrinsic truth of the matter. I want to argue that transhumanists are not ‘enchanted’ but are instead also inspired by awe. Their ‘gut feeling’ about the merit of overcoming limitations justifies arguments for dramatic enhancement.
To develop this argument, we need to assess the psychological investigation of awe which was kick-started by Keltner & Haidt in 2003. They write, ‘two features form the heart of prototypical cases of awe: vastness, and accommodation’ (Keltner & Haidt, 2003). However, there’s an interesting difference between those dispositionally prone to awe and those who are not. Let’s call them the ‘awe-full’ and the awe-less’. The awe-full, when experiencing awe, have greater toleration for uncertainty and greater ability toward accommodation, thus inspiring them to further investigation. Researchers note that this disposition seems to be manifested in scientists and explorers (Gottlieb et al., 2018). The awe-less, in contrast, when experiencing awe, feel less tolerance for uncertainty, but instead an inclination toward conceiving the stimulus as frightening or supernatural, in the realm of the mysterious, untouchable and divine (Valdesolo & Graham, 2014).
If my analysis of the literature on wonder and awe is correct, then many of those who favour dramatic enhancement and ultimately transhumanism, the Prophets, are awe-full – dispositionally prone to awe. Rachel Fredericks argues that awe can be a response to abstractions (Fredericks, 2018). Indeed, Keltner & Haidt specifically refer to grand theories as inducing awe (Keltner & Haidt, 2003). The response of the awe-full, when considering the possibilities that may be open to humanity given medical and technological advances is, not to shy away, but to embrace the uncertainty, the complexity and seek to explore the theory as far as they can push it.
Kass, demonstrating the awe-less response, responds to life as sacred but sees the vast potentialities of enhancement as ‘Frankenstein-ian’ (Kass, 1997). For the transhumanists it is not monsters that they envision, but supermen. Stefan Sorgner regards transhumanism as a Nietzschean project and believes the concept of the ‘overhuman’ (his term) strengthens the ideal of posthumanism by recognising that this vision gives meaning to scientifically minded people in a secularised, technologized, intellectualised and rationalized would that, in Weberian terms, has become ‘disenchanted’ (Sorgner, 2008; Weber, n.d.). One transhumanist was scertainly influenced by Nietzsche (More, 2010) but Bostrom says any similarity is superficial (Bostrom, 2005a)
Still, you don’t need a superman to have a super vision. Tobia writes that while Billy Holmes regards the Superman-ideal (seen as self-transcendence) and compassion as ways to create meaning (Holmes, 2018), he believes that awe is a third meaning-giving response to life (Tobia, 2015). In my view, just as Enlightenment ideals fire the Pragmatists and wonder at the mysteries of life inspire the Preservers, the Prophets are driven by awe at the possibility of transhumanism.
Certainly, in Bostrom’s writing there is evidence of awe. In developing his vision of transhumanism, he has accommodated to an almost unimaginably vast realm of potentiality, while pursuing his ideas and arguments with philosophical rigour. Consider the ‘Letter from Utopia’: ‘[W]hat you had in your best moment is but a beckoning scintilla at most. Not close to what I have. No closer than the word “sun” written in yellow ink is to the actual sun. For I’m beyond words and imagination.’ (Bostrom, 2008) Platonic metaphysics, Christianised by the likes of Boethius and fully secularised by Bostrom. The similarities are not accidental. Bostrom is a visionary: ‘This affirmation of human potential is offered as an alternative to customary injunctions against playing God, messing with nature, tampering with our human essence, or displaying punishable hubris.’ (Bostrom, 2005b)
‘Human potential’ then is the alternative to a proscription against tampering with our human essence. Surprisingly, perhaps, the prophets share the Preservers’ view of human nature as mortal, fragile, flawed and limited. Instead of seeing that as wonderful, they maintain that ‘there is no intrinsic value in human nature in its current form’ (Ranisch, 2014). The Transhumanist project sis not about enhancement of the human essence but about the desire to ‘transcend our natural confines’ (Bostrom, 2005a). Indeed, ‘Transhumanists view human nature as a work-in-progress, a half-baked beginning that we can learn to remold in desirable ways. Current humanity need not be the endpoint of evolution.’ (Bostrom, 2005b). This goes further than the Pragmatist view that ‘[t]o be human is to be better. Or, at least, to strive to be better.’ (Julian Savulescu, 2005)
Again, as with the Preservers, this definition of human nature, as something imperfect, acts as a justification for their position:‘[t]he whole project of transcendence makes sense only if one is limited.’ (Benatar, 2017)
III
I have argued that there is no workable definition of ‘human nature’ which would make the concept of ‘human enhancement’ possible. I have further argued that for Pragmatists, Preservers and Prophets, the views of ‘human nature’ that they advance are not candidates for ‘human enhancement’. For thinkers in these three categories, the definition of ‘what it is to be human’ is instead used to support their case for or against enhancement.
It is interesting to view the different conceptions of human nature held by these groups as, perhaps, evidence of a deeper principle at stake for all of them. Pragmatists have the urge to make things better; Preservers to value what is given and focus on the traditional roles of medicine and (in the case of Sandel) justice in assisting those in need rather than benefiting the already well; Prophets to transcend limitations. All three perspectives consider the imperfect state of the present and seek improvements, with varying amounts of optimism and with different attitudes, toward what is possible, what is valuable and what is meaningful to human beings.
It may be that one key facet of human nature is a search for meaning, as Viktor Frankl (1905-97) suggested. In considering ‘human enhancement’ these thinkers have homed in on what to them is most meaningful in human life and human nature. That their conclusions are varied and, in places, contradictory further supports the claim that there is no realistic single vision of ‘what it is to be human’.
In conclusion, I claim that ‘human enhancement’ is not possible.
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