'On Liberty'

This post is a mistake. A huge mistake. I wanted to look something up in John Stuart Mill's 'On Liberty' and ended up getting completely carried away. The guy was a genius. I didn't appreciate him enough before.

The impetus was that I listened to a podcast interview with Thane Rosenbaum, who's written a book called Saving Free Speech... from itself. He's a lawyer and a liberal yet is advocating some restrictions on free speech. His arguments were persuasive. One example he cited was the Westboro Church people going to military funerals with banners reading things like, 'Your son will burn in hell - he fought for a country that allows faggots' or some such hideous monstrosity. Mourners have to put up with this under the free speech code.

I'd also taken on board some of the younger generation's claims about just not wanting to hear people state cases for arguments they found distasteful or disquieting. I mean, why should they? One can say, don't go to the debate - but if they want their university to feel like a home, then why shouldn't they seek to shape it? Look, I've always hated de-platforming - but that have a point in saying, 'So what if this privileged white person can't speak on our campus? So what if she moans about it in a national newspaper - like we really stopped her speech! We just stopped it here, on our turf. That's our right.'

Then I spoke with Richard. He'd been learning about Herbert Marcuse - who wanted to limit 'oppressive speech', but not liberating speech. I thought, yeah! But Richard said, that's just swapping one dictator for another! He told me that the Hell's Angels have made a habit of drowning out Westboro demonstrations - asserting their free speech in the form of revs as they ride around between protestors and mourners. A noisy funeral, but not so horrific. He also said that he, not in the full-leather-jacket-and-hog fashion, but on two feet, did the same when Westboro protested against female clergy in Richard's town of Santa Clarita. Richard's an organiser of an active atheist group and they banded together with faith groups to prevent the protestors accosting congregants. He said, 'You fight bad speech with better speech, not by suppressing it.' Which, I recalled, is what Mill said.

So I headed to this full script of 'On Liberty' to find the quote and ended up copying about a fifth of the damn paper. As you'll see.

What is so striking is how relevant this text is. Mill's incredible clarity of thought and expression, the force of his arguments and the power of the case also stand out.

My comments are in italics, the rest is from the text.

***

Looking at 'On Liberty' by John Stuart Mill

The essay is putting forward a thesis of what liberty entails. And it begins by claiming that the State, the public, the majority, should not impose its will on the individual: The “people” who exercise the power are not always the same people with those over whom it is exercised; and the “self-government” spoken of is not the government of each by himself, but of each by all the rest. The will of the people, moreover, practically means the will of the most numerous or the most active part of the people; the majority, or those who succeed in making themselves accepted as the majority; the people,consequently may desire to oppress a part of their number; and precautions are as much needed against this as against any other abuse of power.

Here he is stating how important it is for minority views not to be suppressed. The force of a majority can silence dissent by their numbers, and this is dangerous as it would allow them to silence those who are suffering as a result of a regime.

Society can and does execute its own mandates: and if it issues wrong mandates instead of right, or any mandates at all in things with which it ought not to meddle, it practises a social tyranny more formidable than many kinds of political oppression, since, though not usually upheld by such extreme penalties, it leaves fewer means of escape, penetrating much more deeply into the details of life, and enslaving the soul itself. Protection, therefore, against the tyranny of the magistrate is not enough: there needs protection also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling;against the tendency of society to impose, by other means than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them; to fetter the development, and, if possible, prevent the formation, of any individuality not in harmony with its ways, and compels all characters to fashion themselves upon the model of its own.There is a limit to the legitimate interference of collective opinion with individual independence: and to find that limit, and maintain it against encroachment, is as indispensable to a good condition of human affairs, as protection against political despotism.

This is good as he is stressing that majority opinion, even if not mandated by law, can quell all opposition and that tendency must be prevented - particularly because no person, community or society should tell an individual what to think, believe or say.

People are accustomed to believe, and have been encouraged in the belief by some who aspire to the character of philosophers, that their feelings, on subjects of this nature, are better than reasons, and render reasons unnecessary. The practical principle which guides them to their opinions on the regulation of human conduct, is the feeling in each person’s mind that everybody should be required to act as he, and those with whom he sympathises, would like them to act. No one, indeed,acknowledges to himself that his standard of judgment is his own liking; but an opinion on a point of conduct, not supported by reasons, can only count as one person’s preference; and if the reasons, when given, are a mere appeal to a similar preference felt by other people, it is still only many people’s liking instead of one. To an ordinary man, however, his own preference, thus supported, is not only a perfectly satisfactory reason, but the only one he generally has for any of his notions of morality, taste, or propriety, which are not expressly written in his religious creed; and his chief guide in the interpretation even of that.

In this passage he is claiming that while we may 'feel' that what we believe is right, true and just, that is just a feeling and that it has no inherent truth value. He is also making the claim that this is what most people are like - they hold beliefs, which feel right, although they have never subjected those beliefs to rigorous testing. It's just a matter of opinion.

Wherever there is an ascendant class, a large portion of the morality of the country emanates from its class interests, and its feelings of class superiority. [...] The likings and dislikings of society, or of some powerful portion of it, are thus the main thing which has practically determined the rules laid down for general observance, under the penalties of law or opinion.

So he's saying that commonly held beliefs in a society tend to be those suggested by the most powerful (the ruling class, the men, the church - these days perhaps divided between the 'liberal elite' and the 'right-wing press') and that these, again, are just opinions, not anything that could be seen as indubitably right or true.

[T]he sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good,either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot right-fully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others,to do so would be wise, or even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise. To justify that, the conduct from which it is desired to deter him must be calculated to produce evil to some one else.The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.

This is his famous claim that the only cause for restricting an individual is to protect others from harm. He adds that this does not apply to children or those who have lost their reason, or, indeed, in the case of uncivilised people!

Interestingly, Soren Kierkegaard, who was born just seven years after Mill, said that he wanted to have 'The Individual' on his tombstone. The two both stress the importance of the individual, but their claims and conclusions are rather different. Kierkegaard's concern isn't so much about the political implications and importance, but on the spiritual; he's concerned not with what society should not impose on the individual, but with what it means to be an individual, to be personally, passionately committed.

If any one does an act hurtful to others, there is a prima facie case for punishing him, by law, or, where legal penalties are not safely applicable, by general disapprobation. There are also many positive acts for the benefit of others, which he may rightfully be compelled to perform; such as to give evidence in a court of justice; to bear his fair share in the common defence, or in any other joint work necessary to the interest of the society of which he enjoys the protection; and to perform certain acts of individual beneficence, such as saving a fellow creature’s life, or interposing to protect the defenceless against ill-usage, things which whenever it is obviously a man’s duty to do, he may rightfully be made responsible to society for not doing. A person may cause evil to others not only by his actions but by his inaction, and in either case he is justly accountable to them for the injury. The latter case, it is true, requires a much more cautious exercise of compulsion than the former.

This attribution of moral responsibility for omissions as well as commissions is interesting - and I think that though there is a loud shouting for the right not to be interfered with, citing Mill, few tend to recall this duty that he also imposes.

This, then,is the appropriate region of human liberty. It comprises, first, the inward domain of consciousness; demanding liberty of conscience in the most comprehensive sense; liberty of thought and feeling; absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral, or theological. The liberty of expressing and publishing opinions may seem to fall under a different principle, since it belongs to that part of the conduct of an individual which concerns other people; but, being almost of as much importance as the liberty of thought itself, and resting in great part on the same reasons, is practically inseparable from it. Secondly, the principle requires liberty of tastes and pursuits; of framing the plan of our life to suit our own character; of doing as we like, subject to such consequences as may follow: without impediment from our fellow creatures, so long as what we do does not harm them, even though they should think our conduct foolish, per-verse, or wrong. Thirdly, from this liberty of each individual, follows the liberty, within the same limits, of combination among individuals; freedom to unite, for any purpose not involving harm to others: the persons combining being supposed to be of full age, and not forced or deceived.

No society in which these liberties are not, on the whole, respected,is free, whatever may be its form of government; and none is completely free in which they do not exist absolute and unqualified. [...] Each is the proper guardian of his own health, whether bodily, or mental and spiritual. Mankind are greater gainers by suffering each other to live as seems good to themselves, than by compelling each to live as seems good to the rest.

The powerful statement of the three areas of freedom - thought (which includes expressing and publishing such thought); habit and mode of living and to gather with others. The final sentence in the second paragraph is excellent. He sees this freedom as conforming to his concept of utility.

[T]here is also in the world at large an increasing inclination to stretch unduly the powers of society over the individual, both by the force of opinion and even by that of legislation; and as the tendency of all the changes taking place in the world is to strengthen society, and diminish the power of the individual, this encroachment is not one of the evils which tend spontaneously to disappear, but, on the contrary, to grow more and more formidable. The disposition of mankind, whether as rulers or as fellow-citizens, to impose their own opinions and inclinations as a rule of conducton others, is so energetically supported by some of the best and by some of the worst feelings incident to human nature, that it is hardly ever kept under restraint by anything but want of power; and as the power is not declining, but growing, unless a strong barrier of moral conviction can be raised against the mischief, we must expect, in the present circumstances of the world, to see it increase.

This inclination seems to wax and wane - and to shift from the right to the left. While we used to feel constrained by, say, religious mores, now the feeling among some is that 'political correctness' demands too much in the way of restrictions on speech and thought.

I went to a meeting of the 'Academy of Ideas' one year and this was certainly, and continues to be, their view - see what I wrote about being 'judgy'.

If all mankind minus one were of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind. [...] [The peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is robbing the human race; posterity as well as the existing generation; those who dis-sent from the opinion, still more than those who hold it. If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error.

He expresses this very forcibly - even one dissenter must be allowed to speak. The tyranny of the majority (he uses this phrase in the text) must not be accepted. And he has a moral reason for this claim: suppression inhibits the progress for truth. My father often talks of the 'tyranny of the minority', which is the counter-claim of those who feel the burden of 'moral censure' from those who seek to police language in the seemingly ethical cause of preventing harm and pain to long-prejudiced groups.

To refuse a hearing to an opinion, because they are sure that it is false, is to assume that their certainty is the same thing as absolute certainty. All silencing of discussion is an assumption of infallibility. Its condemnation may be allowed to rest on this common argument, not the worse for being common.

Unfortunately for the good sense of mankind, the fact of their fallibility is far from carrying the weight in their practical judgment which is always allowed to it in theory; for while every one well knows himself to be fallible, few think it necessary to take any precautions against their own fallibility, or admit the supposition that any opinion, of which they feel very certain, may be one of the examples of the error to which they acknowledge themselves to be liable. [...] People... who sometimes hear their opinions disputed, and are not wholly unused to be set right when they are wrong, place the same unbounded reliance only on such of their opinions as are shared by all who surround them, or to whom they habitually defer; for in proportion to a man’s want of confidence in his own solitary judgment, does he usually repose, with implicit trust, on the infallibility of “the world” in general. And the world, to each individual, means the part of it with which he comes in contact; his party, his sect, his church, his class of society; the man may be called, by comparison, almost liberal and large-minded to whom it means anything so comprehensive as his own country or his own age. Nor is his faith in this collective authority at all shaken by his being aware that other ages, countries, sects, churches,classes, and parties have thought, and even now think, the exact reverse. He devolves upon his own world the responsibility of being in the right against the dissentient worlds of other people; and it never troubles him that mere accident has decided which of these numerous worlds is the object of his reliance, and that the same causes which make him a Churchman in London, would have made him a Buddhist or a Confucian in Pekin. Yet it is as evident in itself, as any amount of argument can make it, that ages are no more infallible than individuals; every age having held many opinions which subsequent ages have deemed not only false but absurd; and it is as certain that many opinions now general will be rejected by future ages, as it is that many, once general, are rejected by the present.

This is - clearly and powerfully put - the case I made for seeking to take off our blinkers and realise that we are always looking at the world through our own inherited belief system. See Changing minds and Clarity.

[He imagines an objection] If we were never to act on our opinions, because those opinions may be wrong, we should leave all our interests uncared for, and all our duties unperformed. [When people are sure they are right] (such reasoners may say), it is not conscientiousness but cowardice to shrink from acting on their opinions, and allow doctrines which they honestly think dangerous to the welfare of mankind, either in this life or in another, to be scattered abroad without restraint, because other people,in less enlightened times, have persecuted opinions now believed to be true.

[He replies to this objection] There is the greatest difference between presuming an opinion to be true, because, with every opportunity for contesting it, it has not been refuted, and assuming its truth for the purpose of not permitting its refutation. Complete liberty of contradicting and disproving our opinion is the very condition which justifies us in assuming its truth for purposes of action; and on no other terms can a being with human faculties have any rational assurance of being right.

Martha Nussbaum uses the same technique in Upheavals of Thought - putting the case of the 'adversary' and responding to it. This tends to disarm opponents as their case against the argument has already been met.

Here he argues for epistemic humility and claims that just thinking about something isn't enough to ascribe truth value to it, nor is experience - it takes discussion too. He says that all that is respectable in the intellectual and moral being of humans arises from the willingness to correct errors: Wrong opinions and practices gradually yield to fact and argument; but facts and arguments, to produce any effect on the mind, must be brought before it. Very few facts are able to tell their own story, without comments to bring out their meaning. The whole strength and value, then, of human judgment, depending on the one property, that it can be set right when it is wrong, reliance can be placed on it only when the means of setting it right are kept constantly at hand. In the case of any person whose judgment is really deserving of confidence, how has it become so? Because he has kept his mind open to criticism of his opinions and conduct. Because it has been his practice to listen to all that could be said against him; to profit by as much of it as was just, and expound to himself, and upon occasion to others, the fallacy of what was fallacious. Because he has felt, that the only way in which a human being can make some approach to knowing the whole of a subject, is by hearing what can be said about it by persons of every variety of opinion, and studying all modes in which it can be looked at by every character of mind. No wise man ever acquired his wisdom in any mode but this; nor is it in the nature of human intellect to become wise in any other manner. The steady habit of correcting and completing his own opinion by collating it with those of others, so far from causing doubt and hesitation in carrying it into practice, is the only stable foundation for a just reliance on it: for,being cognisant of all that can, at least obviously, be said against him,and having taken up his position against all gainsayers—knowing that he has sought for objections and difficulties, instead of avoiding them,and has shut out no light which can be thrown upon the subject from any quarter—he has a right to think his judgment better than that of any person, or any multitude, who have not gone through a similar process.

It is not too much to require that what the wisest of mankind, those who are best entitled to trust their own judgment, find necessary to warrant their relying on it, should be submitted to by that miscellaneous collection of a few wise and many foolish individuals, called the public.

To call any proposition certain, while there is any one who would deny its certainty if permitted, but who is not permitted, is to assume that we ourselves, and those who agree with us, are the judges of certainty, and judges without hearing the other side.

In the present age—which has been described as “destitute of faith, but terrified at scepticism”—in which people feel sure, not so much that their opinions are true, as that they should not know what to do without them—the claims of an opinion to be protected from public attack are rested not so much on its truth, as on its importance to society. There are, it is alleged, certain beliefs so useful, not to say indispensable, to well-being that it is as much the duty of governments to uphold those beliefs, as to protect any other of the interests of society.

This section is fascinating. One of John Vervaeke's claims is that there is a crisis of meaning in society, it's what Leszek Kolakowski was concerned about, it's what frustrated me when I wrote about The 'value' of knowledge. Instead of seeking knowledge, people seek to find a consoling answer from some past thinker. Instead of being able to deal in uncertainty, they fixate on received wisdom. Instead of exploring, they settle for something that fits what they want to believe.

Mill goes on to argue that in his society, people were as happy to settle for opinions that were deemed to be 'useful' or 'good' as when they were indeed 'true'. In these cases, they show the same arrogant disregard of dissent and favouring of one opinion over another without due justification - because full discussion hadn't determined whether the new view might not be 'more useful'. In addition, the truth is still important and thus the need for open discussion remains paramount. He uses the example of claims that it is' immoral' or 'impious' to question the reality of God or heaven - the issue of religious tolerance was at the forefront of his mind. He cites the death of Socrates (immoral and impious, according to the judiciary) and Christ (denounced as a blasphemer) in evidence.

No one can be a great thinker who does not recognise, that as a thinker it is his first duty to follow his intellect to whatever conclusions it may lead. Truth gains more even by the errors of one who, with due study and preparation, thinks for himself, than by the true opinions of those who only hold them because they do not suffer themselves to think. Not that it is solely, or chiefly, to form great thinkers, that freedom of thinking is required. On the contrary, it is as much and even more indispensable to enable average human beings to attain the mental stature which they are capable of. There have been, and may again be, great individual thinkers in a general atmosphere of mental slavery. But there never has been, nor ever will be, in that atmosphere an intellectually active people. Where any people has made a temporary approach to such a character, it has been because the dread of heterodox speculation was for a time suspended. Where there is a tacit convention that principles are not to be disputed; where the discussion of the greatest questions which can occupy humanity is considered to be closed, we cannot hope to find that generally high scale of mental activity which has made some periods of history so remarkable.

Here he is stating that one must think for oneself - a case strongly made too by Arthur Schopenhauer. In addition, that in an environment where intellectual exploration is inhibited, not only will you not get a genius, but also the public in general will never be intellectually active. This leads to a population that lacks 'the dignity of thinking beings.'

However unwillingly a person who has a strong opinion may admit the possibility that his opinion may be false, he ought to be moved by the consideration that, however true it may be, if it is not fully, frequently, and fearlessly discussed, it will be held as a dead dogma,not a living truth.

There is a class of persons (happily not quite so numerous as formerly) who think it enough if a person assents undoubtingly to what they think true, though he has no knowledge whatever of the grounds of the opinion, and could not make a tenable defence of it against the most superficial objections. Such persons, if they can once get their creed taught from authority, naturally think that no good, and some harm,comes of its being allowed to be questioned. [...] [A]ssuming that the true opinion abides in the mind, but abides as a prejudice, a belief independent of, and proof against,argument—this is not the way in which truth ought to be held by a rational being. This is not knowing the truth. Truth, thus held, is but one superstition the more, accidentally clinging to the words which enunciate a truth.

Where one hasn't thought through ideas for oneself, where ideas have not been subject to rigorous discussion, they become 'dead dogma'. This is an important concept for Mill. Like the existentialists, he seems to feel that where one has not performed this kind of rigour in thinking, but just adopted ideas, habits, customs, one is acting in 'bad faith'.

[W]hen we turn to subjects infinitely more complicated, to morals, religion, politics, social relations, and the business of life, three-fourths of the arguments for every disputed opinion consist in dispelling the appearances which favour some opinion different from it. The greatest orator, save one, of antiquity, has left it on record that he always studied his adversary’s case with as great, if not still greater, intensity than even his own. What Cicero practised as the means of forensic success requires to be imitated by all who study any subject in order to arrive at the truth. He who knows only his own side of the case, knows little of that. His reasons may be good, and no one may have been able to refute them. But if he is equally unable to refute the reasons on the opposite side; if he does not so much as know what they are, he has no ground for preferring either opinion. The rational position for him would be suspension of judgment, and unless he contents himself with that, he is either led by authority, or adopts, like the generality of the world, the side to which he feels most inclination. Nor is it enough that he should hear the arguments of adversaries from his own teachers, ... He must be able to hear them from persons who actually believe them; who defend them in earnest, and do their very utmost for them. He must know them in their most plausible and persuasive form; he must feel the whole force of the difficulty which the true view of the subject has to encounter and dispose of; else he will never really possess himself of the portion of truth which meets and removes that difficulty.

This is a strong claim: one can only really vouch that one holds a belief when one has tested it against the very best arguments. How many of us do this?

All Christians believe that the blessed are the poor and humble, and those who are ill-used by the world; that it is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of heaven; that they should judge not, lest they be judged; that they should swear not at all; that they should love their neighbour as themselves;that if one take their cloak, they should give him their coat also; that they should take no thought for the morrow; that if they would be perfect they should sell all that they have and give it to the poor. They are not insincere when they say that they believe these things. They do believe them, as people believe what they have always heard lauded and never discussed. But in the sense of that living belief which regulates conduct, they believe these doctrines just up to the point to which it is usual to act upon them. The doctrines in their integrity are serviceable to pelt adversaries with; and it is understood that they are to be put forward (when possible) as the reasons for whatever people do that they think laudable. But any one who reminded them that the maxims require an infinity of things which they never even think of doing, would gain nothing but to be classed among those very unpopular characters who affect to be better than other people. The doctrines have no hold on ordinary believers—are not a power in their minds. They have an habitual respect for the sound of them, but no feeling which spreads from the words to the things signified, and forces the mind to take them in,and make them conform to the formula. Whenever conduct is concerned, they look round for Mr. A and B to direct them how far to go in obeying Christ.

I enjoyed this passage though it sits out of context here - the point he's making relates to 'dead dogma rather than living truth' - and supports the existentialist view of bad faith. Kierkegaard regularly makes the same kind of criticism. In his view, to be religious is to make a profound individual commitment, a leap of faith, and this kind of unthinking behaviour is meaningless.

If there are any persons who contest a received opinion, or who will do so if law or opinion will let them, let us thank them for it, open our minds to listen to them, and rejoice that there is some one to do for us what we otherwise ought, if we have any regard for either the certainty or the vitality of our convictions, to do with much greater labour for ourselves.

No de-platforming for JSM!

Popular opinions, on subjects not palpable to sense, are often true, but seldom or never the whole truth. They are a part of the truth; sometimes a greater, sometimes a smaller part, but exaggerated, distorted, and disjointed from the truths by which they ought to be accompanied and limited. Heretical opinions,on the other hand, are generally some of these suppressed and neglected truths, bursting the bonds which kept them down, and either seeking reconciliation with the truth contained in the common opinion, or fronting it as enemies, and setting themselves up, with similar exclusiveness, as the whole truth. The latter case is hitherto the most frequent, as, in the human mind, one-sidedness has always been the rule, and many-sidedness the exception. Hence, even in revolutions of opinion, one part of the truth usually sets while another rises. Even progress, which ought to superadd, for the most part only substitutes, one partial and incomplete truth for another; improvement consisting chiefly in this, that the new fragment of truth is more wanted, more adapted to the needs of the time,than that which it displaces. Such being the partial character of prevailing opinions, even when resting on a true foundation, every opinion which embodies somewhat of the portion of truth which the common opinion omits, ought to be considered precious, with whatever amount of error and confusion that truth may be blended. No sober judge of human affairs will feel bound to be indignant because those who force on our notice truths which we should otherwise have overlooked, over-look some of those which we see. Rather, he will think that so long as popular truth is one-sided, it is more desirable than otherwise that unpopular truth should have one-sided assertors too; such being usually the most energetic, and the most likely to compel reluctant attention to the fragment of wisdom which they proclaim as if it were the whole.

I think this is very good, very important. It is hubris to think we have the whole truth - and to great an interlocutor the respect that they, like we, have partial truth seems to me to be a great way to encourage open and substantive dialogues, without which not just co-operation and collaboration but communication are impossible.

In politics, again, it is almost a commonplace, that a party of order or stability, and a party of progress or reform, are both necessary elements of a healthy state of political life; until the one or the other shall have so enlarged its mental grasp as to be a party equally of order and of progress, knowing and distinguishing what is fit to be preserved from what ought to be swept away. Each of these modes of thinking derives its utility from the deficiencies of the other; but it is in a great measure the opposition of the other that keeps each within the limits of reason and sanity. Unless opinions favourable to democracy and to aristocracy, to property and to equality, to cooperation and to competition, to luxury and to abstinence, to sociality and individuality, to liberty and discipline, and all the other standing antagonisms of practical life, are ex-pressed with equal freedom, and enforced and defended with equal talent and energy, there is no chance of both elements obtaining their due; one scale is sure to go up, and the other down. Truth, in the great practical concerns of life, is so much a question of the reconciling and combining of opposites, that very few have minds sufficiently capacious and impartial to make the adjustment with an approach to correctness,and it has to be made by the rough process of a struggle between combatants fighting under hostile banners. On any of the great open questions just enumerated, if either of the two opinions has a better claim than the other, not merely to be tolerated, but to be encouraged and countenanced, it is the one which happens at the particular time and place to be in a minority. That is the opinion which, for the time being,represents the neglected interests, the side of human well-being which is in danger of obtaining less than its share. [...] When there are persons to be found who form an exception to the apparent unanimity of the world on any subject, even if the world is in the right, it is always probable that dissentients have something worth hearing to say for themselves, and that truth would lose something by their silence.

Interesting. So, a political party, like any single opinion or customary way of being, holds half the truth and a society is balanced and enabled by the tension between them. At the end of this passage he makes an important claim: that those who deviate from any majority view are especially important in the public discourse. Unpopular opinions should be heard.

He then considers an objection to those who might claim that any dissent from Christian morality would be wrong and should be suppressed. In addressing this, he considers all that makes up what is taken to be Christian morality - it's not just the New Testament, not just the Bible, there have been ideas and traditions, habits and customs added throughout history - by humans. In addition, he does on, the traditional concept of Christian morality remains limited and one-sided. Back to the text...

Christian morality (so called) has all the characters of a reaction; it is, in great part, a protest against Paganism. Its ideal is negative rather than positive; passive rather than active; Innocence rather than Nobleness; Abstinence from Evil,rather than energetic Pursuit of Good; in its precepts (as has been well said) “thou shalt not” predominates unduly over “thou shalt.” In its horror of sensuality, it made an idol of asceticism, which has been gradually compromised away into one of legality. It holds out the hope of heaven and the threat of hell, as the appointed and appropriate motives to a virtuous life: in this falling far below the best of the ancients, and doing what lies in it to give to human morality an essentially selfish character, by disconnecting each man’s feelings of duty from the interests of his fellow creatures, except so far as a self-interested inducement is offered to him for consulting them. It is essentially a doctrine of passive obedience; it inculcates submission to all authorities found established; who indeed are not to be actively obeyed when they command what religion forbids, but who are not to be resisted, far less rebelled against, for any amount of wrong to ourselves. And while, in the morality of the best Pagan nations, duty to the State holds even a disproportionate place, infringing on the just liberty of the individual; in purely Christian ethics, that grand department of duty is scarcely noticed or acknowledged. It is in the Koran, not the New Testament, that we read the maxim—“A ruler who appoints any man to an office, when there is in his dominions another man better qualified for it, sins against God and against the State.” What little recognition the idea of obligation to the public obtains in modern morality is derived from Greek and Roman sources, not from Christian; as, even in the morality of private life,whatever exists of magnanimity, highmindedness, personal dignity, even the sense of honour, is derived from the purely human, not the religious part of our education, and never could have grown out of a standard of ethics in which the only worth, professedly recognised, is that of obedience.

Consider Nietzsche here! Both when he talks of resentment and when he puts forward the importance of saying Yes! This shocked and surprised me more than any other passage! It's worth noting that JSM is especially concerned about religious sectarianism at this point.

Not the violent conflict between parts of the truth, but the quiet suppression of half of it, is the formidable evil; there is always hope when people are forced to listen to both sides; it is when they attend only to one that errors harden into prejudices, and truth itself ceases to have the effect of truth, by being exaggerated into falsehood. And since there are few mental attributes more rare than that judicial faculty which can sit in intelligent judgment between two sides of a question, of which only one is represented by an advocate before it, truth has no chance but in proportion as every side of it, every opinion which embodies any fraction of the truth, not only finds advocates, but is so advocated as to be listened to.

The importance of listening.

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This is long enough! But there is more to come from the same work in the following post.